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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at shedding light on the influence of guarantees on the loan pricing. After 
reviewing the literature on the role of guarantees in bank lending decisions, we estimate a bank 
interest rate model that explicitly includes collateral and personal guarantees as explanatory 
variables. We show that banks follow different lending policies according to the type of customer. 
In the case of firms banks seem to efficiently screen and monitor customers, and guarantees (real 
and personal) are used to reduce moral hazard problems. In the case of consumer households and 
sole proprietorships banks behave “lazily” by replacing screening and monitoring activities with 
personal guarantees. Collateral, instead, is used to separate good from bad customers (i.e., to 
mitigate adverse selection problems).  
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This paper aims at shedding light on the influence of guarantees on the loan pricing (banking 
interest rates), by focusing on three different types of customers: firms, sole proprietorships and 
consumer households. The relevance of guarantees in lending activity is widespread acknowledged, 
and their role is even recognized in the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) that foresees a specific 
regulation for secured loans.  
As for guarantees, it is important to distinguish between inside collateral and outside 
collateral, and between real and personal guarantees. Inside collateral is physical assets owned by 
the borrower, and it is mainly used to order creditors priority in the case of default. Outside 
collateral is assets posted by external grantors, and it increases the potential loss of the borrower in 
the case of bankruptcy. Therefore, the relationship between risk and guarantees should be stronger 
in the case of outside collateral, given that inside collateral does not provide additional losses to the 
borrower if he defaults. However, given the lack of detailed information on inside and outside 
collateral, this paper does not distinguish between different types of collateral.  
Personal guarantees are contractual obligations of a third party, and they act as they were 
external collateral. However, they do not give the lender a specific claim on particular assets, and 
restrict the actions he could take in the case of the borrower’s bankruptcy. Consequently, only 
empirical analysis may help to distinguish which of the two types of guarantees (real and personal) 
has a larger impact on the loan interest rate.  
While the existence of a positive relationship between interest rates and the riskiness of 
borrowers (in this paper approximated by bad loans) is well established in the literature, the role of 
guarantees is less clear. Economists’ instinct and conventional wisdom in the banking community 
would support the idea that secured loans are less risky and, therefore, should carry lower interest 
rates. However, some papers find an unexpected positive relationship between interest rates and 
guarantees (see, for example, Barro, 1976, Berger and Udell, 1990): “This result has two major 
implications: that secured loans are typically made to borrowers considered ex-ante riskier by 
banks, and that the presence of warranties is insufficient to offset such higher credit-risk” (Pozzolo, 
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2004). The higher interest rates applied to loans backed by guarantees may also be due to the effects 
of asymmetric information. On the one hand, banks might ask for guarantees when they need to 
distinguish the ex-ante risk of different types of borrowers (adverse selection). Alternatively, banks 
may use guarantees as an incentive mechanism to reduce the possibility of opportunistic behavior of 
borrowers after the transaction occurred (moral hazard). In addition, the right to repossess collateral 
gives lenders an essential threat to ensure that borrowers have an incentive to use the money 
borrowed productively. 
In this paper, we aim at analysing whether: 
•  the conventional wisdom that secured loans are less risky (and, thus, they carry lower 
interest rates) is supported by empirical evidence. We will also look at the differential effect 
on interest rates of real or personal guarantees; 
•  collateral reduces the screening activity of banks and increases the risk of moral hazard.  
This “lazy” screening activity may affect allocation of funds in favour of projects with lower 
returns but that provide more collateral. 
Our work is in the same line as Pozzolo’s (2004). However, while the latter is mainly focused 
on the relationship between guarantees and the likelihood of obtaining loans, our paper studies the 
relationship between bank interest rates and guarantees. 
Our analysis refers to the Italian credit market and uses aggregated and individual statistics 
drawn from the ESCB (European System of Central Banks) harmonized data, the Statistical Return, 
and the Central Credit Register. Aggregated data at bank level are semi-annual and refer to the 
period June 2003 - June 2006; individual data at the bank-customer level are annual. Information 
refer to three types of customers (firms, consumer households and sole proprietorships), consistent 
with the ESA95 definition.  
Our main results show differences in the role played by guarantees in the setting of interest 
rates. In the case of firms, banks require collateral to reduce the possibility of opportunistic 
behavior of small-sized borrowers after the transaction occurred (moral hazard), while they are used 
as a signalling device to solve the adverse selection problem by larger companies. Therefore, more 
collateral means higher interest rates in the case of small-sized firms and lower interest rates in the 
case of larger firms, respectively. As for consumer households and sole proprietorships results are 
less clear-cut: only collateral seems to play a positive impact on interest rates, even though results 
are not very robust. Indeed, banks behave “lazily” by replacing screening and monitoring activities 
with personal guarantees. 
    5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic literature on guarantees 
and bank interest rates, while Section 3 describes data used and provides some descriptive statistics; 
Section 4 reports econometric exercises and discusses results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the 
findings.  
 
2. A review of the literature 
 
In countries like Italy, whose economy is largely dominated by small companies, the 
provision of real and personal guarantees has always played a major role in facilitating the flow of 
credit to borrowers. 
The role of collateral and guarantees in lending relationship has been widely discussed, and 
different conclusions have been reached. Theoretically, under perfect information, the bank can 
distinguish between different types of borrowers, has perfect knowledge about the riskiness of their 
investment projects, therefore there is no need for guarantees.  
Under asymmetric information, however, collateral and personal guarantees play a role in 
solving different problems that may arise (Ono and Uesugi, 2006).  
First of all, there are problems linked to the riskiness of the borrower. A hidden information-
adverse selection  problem arises in situations in which banks cannot discern the ex-ante riskiness 
of the entrepreneur. Without guarantees, the average loan rate would be higher than the rate optimal 
for safe borrowers, and only riskier borrowers would apply for banks loans. In these situations 
collateral and personal guarantees act as a screening device to distinguish the ex-ante riskiness of 
the entrepreneur, and the lower risk borrower will choose the contract with guarantees in order to 
take advantage of the lower interest rate (Bester, 1985 and 1987).
2  
A hidden action-moral hazard problem arises when banks cannot observe the borrower 
behaviour after the loan is granted. In these situations guarantees are used as an incentive device, 
and reduce the debtor incentive to strategically default. As Boot et al. (1991) showed, if there is 
substitutability between the borrower quality and action, the riskier borrower pledges more 
guarantees, while the good borrower gets an unsecured loan. 
Moreover, there are studies that analyze the association between the length of the bank-
borrower relationship and guarantees requirements in both adverse selection and moral hazard 
settings. Among others, Boot and Thakor (1994) analyzed repeated moral hazard  in a competitive 
credit market. They found that a long term banking relationship benefits the borrowers: borrowers 
                                                 
2 However, in the presence of debt renegotiation, renegotiation might undermine the role of collateral as a screening 
device in the sense that if collateralization becomes attractive also for high risk entrepreneurs, the low risk 
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pay higher interest rates and pledge guarantees early in the relationship, but, once their first project 
is successful, they are awarded with unsecured loans and lower loan rates.  
In a principal-agent setting, John et al. (2003) find that guarantees decrease the riskiness of a 
given loan, and that collateralized debt has higher yield than general debt, after controlling for 
credit rationing.  
Guarantees influence the screening and monitoring activities of banks. Given the role of 
banks as information providers, different findings are found in the economic literature on the impact 
of collateral and personal guarantees on bank’s screening and monitoring activities. According to 
the lazy bank hypothesis (Manove, Padilla, and Pagano, 2001), the presence of a high level of 
guarantees weakens the bank’s incentive to evaluate the profitability of a planned investment 
project. In this case guarantees and screening are substitutes for a bank, but they are not equivalent 
from a social standpoint. Indeed, the authors find that putting an upper bound threshold on the 
amount of guarantees relative to the project value is efficient in competitive credit markets. Rajan 
and Winton (1995), on the other hand, argue that a high level of collateralization might be 
considered as a sign that the borrower is in difficult, given that the bank usually has a greater 
incentive to ask for guarantees when the borrowers prospects are poor. Therefore, the monitoring 
activity should be higher in the presence of higher debt securitization. Longhofer and Santos (2000) 
argue that guarantees and monitoring are complements when banks take senior positions on their 
small business loans. 
Collateral and personal guarantees requirements might be affected by credit market 
competition. Besanko and Thakor (1987) analyze the role of credit market structures in the presence 
of asymmetric information. The authors find that in a competitive market guarantees are useful in 
solving adverse selection problems: low risk borrowers choose a contract with a high level of 
guarantees and a low loan rate, whereas high risk borrowers choose a contract with a low level of 
guarantees and a high loan rate. In the monopolistic setting, instead, collateral and personal 
guarantees play no role unless it is sufficiently valuable to the bank to make the loan riskless. 
Inderst and Mueller (2006) analyze a model with different types of lenders: local lenders, who have 
soft and non contractable information advantages, and transaction lenders (lenders located outside 
local markets). The authors show that local lenders should reduce the loan rate and increase 
guarantees requirements to maintain their competitive advantage, as long as the information 
advantage narrows and the competitive pressure from transaction lenders increases. 
Empirical results on the impact of collateral and personal guarantees on the loan rate are not 
homogeneous either. Indeed, on the one hand, there should be a negative correlation between 
guarantees and risk premium if collateral and personal guarantees are used as a signalling device to   7
solve the adverse selection problem. On the other hand, the correlation should be positive if 
guarantees are used as an incentive device to reduce moral hazard, and the ex- ante risk of the 
borrower is observed. Berger and Udell (1990) find that guarantees are most often associated with 
riskier borrowers, riskier loans, and riskier banks, supporting the idea that observably riskier 
borrowers are asked to pledge more guarantees to mitigate the moral hazard problem. Ono and 
Uesugi (2006), who analyze the small business loan market in Japan, reach similar results. The 
authors find that guarantees are more likely to be pledged by riskier borrowers. Pozzolo (2004) 
argues that, when testing the relationship between risk and collateralization, it is important to 
distinguish between inside collateral and outside collateral, and between real and personal 
guarantees. The author finds that real guarantees are not statistically related to the borrower risk. He 
interprets this finding as potentially consistent with the hypothesis that inside collateral is used as a 
signalling device to solve the adverse selection problem. Differently, he finds that personal 
guarantees are more likely to be asked for when the borrower is ex-ante riskier. However, once the 
borrower’s riskiness is controlled for, both real and personal guarantees reduce the interest rate 
charged on loans. Jimènez, Salas-Fumàs and Saurina (2006) find direct evidence of a negative 
association between collateral and the borrower’s risk. 
Some authors investigate the relationship of other variables on the probability for a loan to be 
secured. Berger and Udell (1995) and Jimènez, Salas-Fumàs and Saurina (2006) find that borrowers 
with longer banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge guarantees. 
Particularly, Berger and Udell (1995) find that the older a firm is and the longer its banking 
relationship is, the less often the firm will pledge guarantees. The result is seen as consistent with 
the idea that requiring guarantees early in a relationship may be useful in solving moral hazard 
situations. Berger and Udell (1995) also find a positive relationship between the value of total assets 
of the borrowing firms, that is a measure of firm size, and the probability to get a secured loan.  
As for the impact of the bank-firm relationship on the loan rate, Chakravarty and Yilmazer 
(2005) assert that the overall granting process is a sequential process given by three stages: 
application, decision and rate setting. The authors find that the lending relationship matters only in 
the first and second stages, i.e.: conditional on being approved, relationships are not important in 
determining the loan rate. Similarly, Petersen and Rajan (1994) do not find statistical evidence that 
the strength of the lender-borrower relationship is correlated with cheaper credit. The authors also 
find that firms that borrow from multiple banks are charged a significantly higher rate.  
As for the effects of guarantees on screening and monitoring activities of banks, empirical 
implications of the above theoretical models are mixed. According to the lazy bank hypothesis, a 
higher screening activity should be observed when borrowers post low guarantees. Further, the   8
average debt default should be higher when the creditors rights are more strictly enforced given that 
fewer projects will be screened in this case. Differently, Rajan and Winton (1995) predict that 
secured debt should be observed more often in firms that need monitoring, and that changes in 
guarantees should be positively correlated with the onset of financial distress. Jimènez, Salas-Fumàs 
and Saurina (2006) discuss how the use of collateral as a substitute to the screening activity of the 
bank depends on lenders characteristics. 
Finally, the theoretical models on the relationship between guarantees and competition predict 
a positive correlation between bank competition and guarantees requirements. Similarly the 
empirical analysis of Jimènez, Salas-Fumàs and Saurina (2006) find that the use of collateral is less 
likely in more concentrated markets. Petersen and Rajan (1995) analyze the effect of credit market 
competition on lending relationship and find that firms in the most concentrated credit markets are 
the least credit rationed, and that banks in more concentrated markets charge lower than competitive 
interest rates on young firms, and higher than competitive interest rates on older firms.    
 
3. Data and summary statistics 
 
This paper uses aggregated and individual Italian bank and firm data drawn from several 
sources. 
Aggregated time series on interest rates are drawn from harmonized MIR (Monetary Financial 
Institution Interest Rates) statistics, collected by the Eurosystem since January 2003; this 
information is provided by a representative sample of banks, made up of about 120 Italian banks 
(which represent about 75 per cent of total assets of Italian banking system).
3 Aggregated data on 
real and personal guarantees are drawn from bank supervision reports and refer to the whole 
banking industry.  
Individual information comes from Central Credit Register and regards a sample made up of 
60 large Italian banks (which represent more than 50 per cent of total assets of Italian banking 
system); the data set with individual customer information includes more than 300,000 borrowers, 
who received from Italian banks loans equal or larger than € 75,000. 
Time series on loans mostly start from 1999 and refer to the whole banking system. Time 
series on interest rates start from 2003, the first year of the MIR statistics, and refer to a sample of 
banks.  
Our analysis mainly focuses on real and personal guarantees pledged by non-financial 
corporations (firms), sole proprietorships and consumer households. Information on sole 
                                                 
3 For further details, see Regulation ECB/2001/18, and Battipaglia and Bolognesi (2003).   9
proprietorships and consumer households does not come from the MIR statistics but it is provided 
by Italian banks.  
Table 1 shows loan distribution by type of guarantees and customers. It appears that sole 
proprietorships are more similar to firms than to consumer households: loan shares to sole 
proprietorships assisted by real and personal guarantees are similar to those of firms than to those of 
consumer households. 
The increase in the share of collateral reflects the growth of mortgages, given that the Italian 
Regulation requires that mortgage loans have to be assisted by real guarantees. For the three types 
of customers as a whole, the 2005 value of mortgage loans is about twice as large as the 1999 value 
(see Table 2). 
More specifically, the loan share of consumer households assisted by real security is more 
than twice as large as that of non-financial corporations; this result mainly reflects the fact that a 
high percentage of loans to consumer households are for house purchase (about two third of total 
loans), a large part of which is granted against mortgage. The magnitude of real guarantees 
influences the trend of loan shares to consumer households with personal guarantees: it was almost 
10% in 1999, but it dropped to around half of it in 2005. Finally, the loan shares with no guarantees 
averaged around 24% between 1999 and 2005, but they show a negative trend over the years. 
As for firms, consistently with the observed increase in mortgages (Table 2), collateralized 
loans grew from 24% in 1999 to 32.2% in 2005 (Table1). Unsecured loans are the most important 
loan category: they are almost half of  firms’ total loans. This result likely depends upon the better 
quality information of firms in comparison with households’. 
Differently, but not surprising given that the share of mortgage granted to consumer 
households have to be assisted by collateral, the share of personal guarantees is higher for non-
financial corporations than for consumer households, the reasons being the higher riskiness of firms 
versus consumer households, the need for the lenders to ask for personal guarantees when they 
cannot request collateral (for example because of supervisory rules) or, in other cases, because of 
specific legal requirements (e.g. for public works credit).   
Figures for sole proprietorships seem more similar to firms than to consumer households. The 
main difference with non-financial corporations is the lower value of unsecured loans: again, this 
could be explained with the higher opacity of sole proprietorships compared to firms.   
As for the composition of bad loans by type of guarantees, the larger share of bad loans 
originates among unsecured loans (Table 3). This share is the largest in the case of consumer 
households and the smallest in the case of firms, in spite of the smaller shares of unsecured loans   10
granted to consumer households (see Table 1). Moreover the share of bad loans associated with 
unsecured loans declined between 1999 and 2005 for all three types of customers. 
The distribution of bad loans among secured loans mirrors the relative weight of the 
different types of loans. This is especially true in the case of consumer households who show a 
larger share of bad loans against mortgages (see Table 3). In the most recent years the distribution 
of bad loans between sole proprietorships and firms became more similar. 
A clearer picture of the risk associated with different customers and type of loans is provided 
by the analysis of the overall bad loan-to-loan ratio, that is traditionally used as a measure of credit 
risk (see Table 4). The ratio is higher for households than for non-financial corporations; sole 
proprietorships turns out as the riskiest customer especially when unsecured loans are taken into 
account. There has been a general improvement of the overall bad loan-to-loan ratio between 1999 
and 2005; however this result is has been determined by extraordinary securitization operations and 
write-offs carried out, especially in 2005.
4 In the same year, sole proprietorships showed the highest 
overall bad loan-to-loan ratio. With the only exception of firms, the default risk increases going 
from collateralized loans to unsecured loans. It is likely that the low default risk associated with 
collateralized loans depends on the type of investment undergone with the mortgage, i.e. the 
purchase of houses and apartments in a period of time characterized by increasing prices.  
 
4. Data, Model Specification, and Results 
 
We estimate two empirical models. The first one makes use of average data at bank level and 
it is estimated for three types of customers: consumer households, firms, and sole proprietorship. 
The second one makes use of information at bank-customer level and it is only estimated for firms. 
A description of variables and descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix 1 and 2.  
The first model relates the interest rate spread (average loan rate-overnight rate) the banks 
charge to different types of borrowers to a set of variables that capture the customer riskiness, the 
presence of guarantees, the length of the lending relationship, the loan size, and the degree of 
market competition plus additional control dummy variables: 
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4 see Bank of Italy (2006), pp. 232 and 315-316.   11
 
where the subscript i refers to banks, t to the time period, and  t i, ε  is a composite error term that 
contains unobserved factors ( i λ , fixed or random), plus a Normally distributed error 
( )) , 0 ( ~  
2
, u t i N u σ . 
We estimate equation [1] for three different types of borrowers: firms, consumer households, 
and sole proprietorships. We run both fixed effects and random effects specifications, but only 
report results for the latter on the base of the Hausman Test.  
Table 5 shows two specifications of equation [1] for each customer type. 
As for firms, in column (1) we control for the business cycle by adding Time Dummies. We 
find that Bad Loans have a positive and significant impact on the interest rate spread, i.e., riskier 
customers are charged with higher interest rates. The coefficient on Collateral is positive and 
significant. As already noted above, inside collateral does not increase the potential loss suffered by 
the borrower, but it is mainly used to order creditors’ priority. Therefore, ex-ante, the expected sign 
of its coefficient is not clear. The fact that the coefficient on Collateral is positive means that 
collateral is mainly used to reduce the moral hazard problem, i.e., observably riskier borrowers are 
asked to pledge more collateral. Personal Guarantees have also a positive and significant 
coefficient. This result is in line with the prevailing literature according to which riskier borrowers 
are asked to pledge personal guarantees (outside collateral) to avoid strategic default. The estimated 
coefficient of the Regional Dummy is not statistically significant, meaning that interest rates 
charged by banks located in the Southern regions are not different from those charged by banks 
located in the rest of Italy. Indeed, it is possible that Southern banks provide loans also to firms 
located in other regions, and/or that other variables (bad loans and guarantees) already capture the 
differences in customers riskiness in different regional areas. The Average Loan Life coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant. This variable is a proxy for the length of the lending 
relationship; therefore, a decrease in the interest rate is expected with an increase in the length of 
the lending relationship. This finding is common to other empirical studies (among others, Berger 
and Udell, 1995; Jimènez, Salas and Saurina, 2006). As long as the length increases, the lender’s 
information about the borrower increases, and the moral hazard problem due to information 
asymmetries becomes less important (Boot and Thakor, 1994). As for the Bank Size Dummy, the 
estimated negative coefficient means that larger banks charge lower interest rates. According to 
Manove and Padilla (1999), and Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) banks with larger resources 
devoted to evaluate the economic risk of a loan should have a lower incentive to substitute the 
screening activity with collateral. On the same direction, Jimènez, Salas and Saurina (2006), argue 
that  larger banks should have a comparative advantage in terms of the borrower’s risk evaluation.   12
Therefore, these banks should have fewer moral hazard problems, and charge lower interest rates. 
The Average Loan Size coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Boot et al. (1991) argue 
that a higher loan dimension reduce the collateral requirement. Moreover, larger loans are a proxy 
for larger firms that have stronger contractual power and, therefore, are expected to pay lower 
interest rates. 
Estimates in column (2) refer to equation [1] when Time Dummies are replaced by Market 
Concentration.
5 The coefficient of Market Concentration is positive and statistically significant, 
meaning that higher loan rates are associated with a higher market concentration. Petersen and 
Rajan (1995) find that the impact of market concentration is different according to the age of the 
firm, negative for young firms, positive for older firms. We cannot disentangle this effect due to the 
lack of information on firms’ age. However, our result also finds theoretical support in the work of 
Inderst and Mueller (2006) who show that an increase in bank competition increases the demand for 
collateral and decreases loan rates. 
As for consumer households, we have two specifications, one with Time Dummies and one 
with the Market Concentration index (columns (3) and (4), respectively). Differently from firms’ 
estimates, the coefficient of Bad Loans is negative but not statistically significant, meaning that 
interest rate is not influenced by households riskiness as measured by the share of Bad Loans. The 
coefficient of Collateral is negative and statistically significant. In this case, therefore, collateral is 
used by safer borrowers to signal their consumer type and take advantage of lower loan rates, as 
expected in an adverse selection setting (Bester, 1985 and 1987). On the other hand, the estimated 
coefficient of Personal Guarantees is not statistically significant. This finding may be interpreted as  
a signal of a possible lazy behaviour of banks that replace the screening activity (i.e.: different loan 
rates to different borrowers type) with personal guarantees. For consumer households, it turns out 
that banks located in the South of Italy charge higher loan rates than in the rest of Italy. Indeed, the 
coefficient of the Regional Dummy is positive and significant. Given that consumer households 
markets are local (local banks serve local households) the interpretation is twofold. On one side, 
Southern consumer households may be recognized riskier. On the other side, Southern credit 
markets may be less competitive than Central and Northern credit markets. Finally, Bank Size is not 
significant in determining the loan rate.  
As for firms, the Market Concentration coefficient is still positive and significant, underlining 
that banks in more concentrated credit markets charge higher rates (Column (4)). Moreover, 
differently from the previous specification, the coefficient of Personal Guarantees is still positive 
but significant. As for firms, therefore, Personal Guarantees are asked to riskier borrowers to 
                                                 
5  Time Dummies and Market Concentration are collinear because the latter is calculated for each market (firms, 
customer households and sole proprietorships) and each time-period.   13
reduce strategic defaults, and some screening activity seem to be performed by banks. However, it 
is worth noting that loans secured by personal guarantees are a small share of the total amount of 
loans to consumer households (Table 2).  
Columns (5) and (6) show results for sole proprietorships, with Time Dummies and Market 
Concentration, respectively. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of Bad Loans 
signals that also in this case higher interest rates are associated with higher risks. As for consumer 
households,  Collateral and Personal Guarantees are asked to mitigate two different kind of 
problems: adverse selection and moral hazard, respectively. Indeed, the estimated coefficients are of 
opposite signs (negative and positive, respectively), but these findings are robust only when we 
control for Market Concentration (see Column (6)). As explained above, this result may indicate the 
lazy bank behaviour is more relevant in the case of sole proprietorships than in the cases of firms 
and consumer households. Banks require secured loans, but not necessarily higher guarantees are 
associated with riskier customers and higher interest rates. Again, the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the Regional Dummy, means that credit markets for sole proprietorships 
are local, as observed in the case of consumer households: Southern sole proprietorships are either 
riskier or they are operating in less competitive credit markets. Finally, for more concentrated credit 
markets, the cost of loan, captured by the loan rate, is higher.  
It is worth noting that the distinction between firms, consumer households, and sole 
proprietorships is empirically important, given the findings are not unique. Our results are: 
•  as expected in adverse selection situations, collateral is mainly used by consumer 
households and sole proprietorships to signal themselves as safer borrowers and take 
advantage of lower interest rates; 
•  there seems to be no robust relationship between interest rates and personal guarantees. 
Banks behave “lazily”, i.e., they simply replace screening and monitoring activities with 
personal guarantees. Therefore, interest rates do not reflect differences in customers’ 
riskiness. 
The second model relates the interest rate spread the banks charge to firms to the bad loan-to-
loan ratio, collateral, personal guarantees, the length of the lending relationship, the loan size,  
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where the subscript i refers to banks, j to firms, t  to time periods, and s to the firm 
industry. t j i , , ε  is a composite error term.  
We estimate equation [2] by running both fixed effects and random effects estimators, but 
only report results for the former on the base of the Hausman Test. This exercise is only carried out 
for firms because the Italian Central Credit Register starts recording loan information from the 
minimum value of €75,000 and larger. Therefore, data on loans to consumer households and sole 
proprietorships could be incomplete because a large share of their loans are smaller than 75,000 
euros. 
The coefficient of Collateral is significant and negative while it was positive in the former 
specification (equation [2]) with data at the bank level. The opposite sign of the estimated 
coefficients of Collateral in equations [1] and [2] likely depends on the different composition of the 
variables. The first model uses aggregated data at bank level and this means that the variable is a 
weighted mean for each bank in the sample; obviously, in this case large customers have a larger 
impact on final statistics at bank level. Instead, the variable at firm and bank level used in this 
second exercise is not a weighted mean and each customer has the same weight; in other words, the 
value of loan does not affect the estimate, while the condition applied to each customer are relevant. 
Thus, in the first model prevails the effect “size of loan”, while in the second model prevails the 
effect “condition of loans”, given that small and medium customers are more than large customers. 
Our results indicate that borrowers that provide collateral are a mix of firms affected both by moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems. According to the remarks on the different variables, the 
group affected by moral hazard problems are firms with small-sized loans; these firms are mostly 
excluded from the Central Credit Register data and, therefore, estimates of equation [2] are 
dominated by firms affected by adverse selection problems. Hence, the negative sign of the 
estimated coefficient of Collateral. The opposite is true with data at the bank level. This 
consideration seems to be confirmed by the outcomes of  Loan Size dummy variable, which is 
negative in both estimates.  
As is the case of equation [1], the coefficient of Personal Guarantees is positive and 
significant; in this case the different composition of variable in the equations does not affect the 
results. Individual data strengthen the evidence that riskier borrowers are asked to pledge more 
outside collateral (personal guarantee) and, consequently, banks ask for higher interest rates. 
The estimated coefficients of the main control variables confirm our previous conclusions. 
The estimated coefficients of Bad Loans,  Loan S ize  and  Loan life are all statistically 
significant and have the same signs as in the case of equation [1]. Bad Loans  has a positive effect 
on interest rates that confirms that a higher default probability (approximated by the ratio bad   15
loans/loans per branch) implies higher interest rates. Loan size and life have both a negative impact 
on interest rates, strengthening the importance of borrowers’ contractual power and of asymmetric 
information problems in setting interest rates, respectively. 
Data at firm level also permit to distinguish between private and state owned firms. The 
binary  Private Firm Dummy, that takes value 1 when firms are private, has a significant and 
positive coefficient. In other words, private firms are recognized  riskier than state owned firms. 
Finally,  Regional Dummies are positive, but not statistically significant. This result could 
supports the interpretation of a single bank loan market, once we control for customer 
characteristics, as a result of the increase in competition in the Italian banking industry that 




This paper analyzed the relationship between guarantees and interest rates in Italy, paying a 
special attention to the distinction between real guarantees (or inside collateral) and personal 
guarantees (outside collateral).  
We attempted to answer to two main questions : 
•  does empirical evidence support the conventional wisdom that secured loans are less risky 
and, thus, they carry lower interest rates? 
•  does empirical evidence support the hypothesis that collateral reduces the screening activity 
of banks (so called “lazy bank hypothesis”) and increases moral hazard risks? 
  First, we carried out our analysis by breaking down Italian banks’ customers in three 
categories (firms, consumer households and sole proprietorships), and using a sample of bank data 
drawn from the Statistical Return. Secondly, we repeated the exercise by means of a large sample 
with individual customer data drawn from the Central Credit Register. In this case only firms were 
included in the sample. 
A first empirical result based on the distribution of loans and guarantees is that sole 
proprietorships behave more similarly to firms than to consumer households. The latter ask for 
loans mainly for house purchases and, thus, pledge a large share of collateral while a very small 
fraction of loans is assisted by personal guarantees. Differently, the share of personal guarantees 
pledges by firms and sole proprietorships is larger. 
In the case of consumer households our econometric analysis provides unclear, or not 
significant estimates about the relationship between guarantees and interest rates. However, this 
result is likely influenced by the existence of the Italian Regulation that requires that real-estate   16
loans have to be assisted by real guarantees. A similar result is obtained in the case of sole 
proprietorships. 
As for firms, both real and personal guarantees have a positive effect on interest rates, thus 
supporting the idea that guarantees help solving moral hazard problems and that banks’ screening 
activity is not “lazy”. It is worth noting that consumer households and sole proprietorships are more 
opaque than firms due to the lack of detailed information. The latter makes it difficult to efficiently 
implement a screening activity. 
The picture for firms is somewhat richer when we used a more detailed dataset containing 
information at the firm level. Interest rates are still significantly affected by guarantees. However, 
while collateral appears to be a device that helps banks solving adverse selection problems, personal 
guarantees are still used to reduce the possibility of opportunistic behavior of borrowers after the 
transaction occurred (moral hazard). 
This paper is a first attempt to shed light on the relationship between guarantees and interest 
rates; future developments will include an analysis with data at the bank-customers level even for 
consumer households and sole proprietorships, income and cost variables and information on 
financial products to manage credit risk (i.e., credit derivates).  
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Table 1 
Composition of Loans by type of guarantee 
(percent) 
 
                    Loans 
  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
All customers 
Collateral  28.3 29.5 29.9 31.7 35.6 38.7 42.7 
Personal Guarantees  20.8 20.4 19.1 18.8 17.6 17.8 15.7 
Unsecured  50.9 50.1 51.0 49.4 46.8 43.5 41.6 
 
Consumer households 
Collateral  63.7 65.9 66.1 67.5 71.1 72.4 72.6 
Personal Guarantees  9.8 8.4 7.6 7.0 6.2 5.8 5.4 
Unsecured  26.4 25.8 26.3 25.6 22.6 21.8 22.0 
 
Sole proprietorships 
Collateral  33.7 35.6 36.2 38.2 43.1 46.1 45.4 
Personal Guarantees  39.3 38.6 36.3 34.6 30.8 30.2 28.0 
Unsecured  27.0 25.8 27.4 27.2 26.1 23.7 26.6 
 
Firms 
Collateral  24.0 24.9 24.6 26.6 29.7 32.0 32.2 
Personal Guarantees  27.1 27.4 25.2 25.6 24.1 24.3 23.6 
Unsecured  48.8 47.7 50.2 47.8 46.2 43.7 44.2 
Source: Calculations based on Bank of Italy data. 




Loans by sectors 




Consumer households  Sole proprietorships  Firms 
 
Consumer credit  Lending for house 
purchase  Other lending  Consumer credit  Lending for house 
purchase  Other lending  Total  of which : 
mortgages 
  stocks  growth 
rate %  stocks  growth 
rate %  stocks  growth 
rate %  stocks  growth 
rate %  stocks  growth 
rate %  stocks  growth 
rate %  stocks  growth 
rate %  stocks  growth 
rate % 
1999  16285    76110    52573    1178    5224    41551    389420    120021   
2000  18835  15.7  90437  18.8  56165  6.8  1330  12.8  5869  12.4  44320  6.7  449792  8.8  133474  10.4 
2001  22172  17.7  101907  12.7  56145  0.0  1494  12.3  6386  8.8  45655  3.0  489564  5.2  147364  12.1 
2002  27160  22.5  120452  18.2  51499  -8.3  1813  21.4  9157  43.4  46855  2.6  514827  7.4  165143  18.1 
2003  30607  12.7  139598  15.9  51447  -0.1  1713  -5.5  11871  29.6  49460  5.6  552775  4.4  195087  10.4 
2004  35609  16.3  168515  20.7  52654  2.3  1674  -2.3  13560  14.2  52333  5.8  577264  6.1  215299  9.6 
2005  41729  17.2  198906  18.0  54856  4.2  1756  12.8  15828  12.4  55136  6.7  612695  15.5  235968  11.2 
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Table 3 
 
Composition of  Bad Loans by type of guarantee 
(percent) 
 
                    Bad  Loans 
  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
All customers 
Collateral  24.2 21.5 23.4 24.4 25.8 27.2 24.0 
Personal Guarantees  21.1 22.6 23.5 25.2 24.0 26.1 26.7 
Unsecured  54.7 55.9 53.1 50.4 50.2 46.7 49.3 
 
Consumer households 
Collateral  24.8 18.8 22.2 25.5 29.4 31.5 28.5 
Personal Guarantees  9.9 11.0 10.7 10.1  9.7 10.1 10.3 
Unsecured  65.3 70.2 67.1 64.4 61.0 58.4 61.3 
 
Sole proprietorships 
Collateral  18.7 16.8 18.3 19.6 22.8 24.3 21.0 
Personal Guarantees  22.8 23.4 22.9 24.2 23.7 26.4 26.4 
Unsecured  58.5 59.9 58.8 56.2 53.4 49.3 52.6 
 
Firms 
Collateral  26.3 24.5 26.2 26.1 26.0 26.9 23.5 
Personal Guarantees  25.0 27.1 28.9 31.7 29.1 31.9 33.0 
Unsecured  48.7 48.5 44.9 42.3 44.9 41.3 43.5 
Source: Calculations based on Bank of Italy data. 




Bad Loans to loans ratios by type of guarantee 
(percent) 
 
  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
All customers 
Collateral  6.6  4.3 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 2.1 
Personal Guarantees  7.8  6.6 5.9 6.4 6.8 7.4 6.2 
Unsecured  8.3  6.6 5.0 4.9 5.4 5.4 4.3 
 
Consumer households 
Collateral  3.3 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.4 
Personal Guarantees  8.6 8.9 7.8 8.1 7.8 8.2 6.6 
Unsecured  21.2 18.4 14.0 14.0 13.5 12.7  9.7 
 
Sole proprietorships 
Collateral  11.1 8.0 7.2 6.8 6.8 6.5 3.7 
Personal Guarantees  11.6  10.3 9.0 9.3 9.9  10.8 7.6 
Unsecured  43.4 39.4 30.7 27.5 26.1 25.7 15.9 
 
Firms 
Collateral  9.6 6.5 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.8 3.4 
Personal Guarantees  8.1 6.5 5.9 6.4 6.8 7.6 6.4 
Unsecured  8.7 6.7 4.6 4.6 5.5 5.4 4.5 
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Table 5 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (1) 
Interest Rate Spread Model – Random Effects Estimates  
Dependent Variable: Spread (Interest Rate – Overnight Rate) 
 































  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Bad loans/loans   2.34
 
(0.73) 
*** 2.38   
( 0.76) 


























0.82   
(0.25) 
















**                 
Average loan size  -0.13 
(0.07) 
** -0.13  
(0.07) 
**                 
Market 
concentration 
   34.84 
(14.17) 
**     45.16  
(8.96) 





-0.10   
(0.11) 
 -0.10   
(0.11) 
 0.81  
(0.19) 




** 0.18   
(0.14) 
 
Bank size dummy 
(large bank=1) 




* -0.01   
(0.17) 







Constant  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Time dummies  9    9    9   
Hausman  Test    0.83  0.25  1.00 1.00 1.00  0.97 
No. of Obs.   704  704  663  663  541  541 
No. of Banks  108  108  105  105  94  94   24
Table 6  
 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (2) 
FIRMS 
Fixed Effects Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable: Spread  
(Interest Rate –Overnight Rate) 
 






Personal guarantees/loans   0.02
(0.001)
** 0.00 
Loan size  -0.59
(0.007)
** 0.00 
Bad loans/loans per branch  1.53
(0.167)
** 0.00 
Private firms dummy  0.42
(0.179)
* 0.02 
Loan life  -0.03
(0.003)
** 0.00 
North dummy  0.01
(0.035)
 0.87 
South dummy  0.01
(0.042)
 0.72 
Constant  9 
Time dummies  9 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.00 
No. of observations  1,425,129 
No. of  firms  307,611 
Robust Standard Errors are shown in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Appendix 1 
 

















(interest rate – overnight rate)  1.55385 0.49343  -0.05043 5.81174 
Bad  Loans/  Loans  0.04693 0.07107 0.00102 0.80954 
Collateral/  Loans  0.33885 0.15871 0.00021 1.00278 
Personal  guarantees/  Loans  0.26367 0.11400 0.00021 1.01054 
Average  Loan  Life  3.01209 0.55327 1.00000 4.00000 
Herfindhal  Index  0.03321 0.00115 0.03186 0.03531 
Loan  Size  (log)  14.20851 1.83523 6.51026  17.72952 
Average Loan Size (log)  6.439886    0.99403    4.043051    11.33795 
Consumer Households 
Spread  
(interest rate – overnight rate)  2.39922 0.86539 0.13627 6.80369 
Bad  Loans/  Loans  0.03990 0.05267 0.00000 0.42781 
Collateral/  Loans  0.68330 0.19187 0.00010 1.00325 
Personal  guarantees/  Loans  0.07108 0.05652 0.00000 0.37049 
Herfindhal  Index  0.04187 0.00283 0.03874 0.04811 
Loan  Size  (log)  13.33072 1.80825 2.99573  17.16740 
Sole Proprietorships 
Spread  
(interest rate – overnight rate)  2.40445 0.53415 0.93664 4.77367 
Bad  Loans/  Loans  0.07697 0.07734 0.00000 0.53959 
Collateral/  Loans  0.40970 0.16942 0.00001 1.00026 
Personal  guarantees/  Loans  0.31058 0.13152 0.00012 0.73091 
Herfindhal  Index  0.03658 0.00054 0.03549 0.03730 
Loan  Size  (log)  12.35439 1.29635 6.87109  15.87353 
 
Bank Interest Rates. Time series on interest rates are drawn from harmonized MIR (Monetary 
Financial Institution Interest Rates) statistics, collected by the Eurosystem since January 2003, primarily 
as a support to monetary policy. However MIR statistics are also suitable for economic analysis at 
national level. This information is collected and compiled by the Eurosystem; it is based on a 
representative sample of banks, made up of about 120 Italian banks. Interest rates on loans to firms is the 
weighted average of new businesses up to and over € 1 million; interest rates on loans to consumer   26
households and sole proprietorships is the weighted average of new businesses granted for consumer 
credit, house purchases and other purposes. Overnight interest rates are the arithmetic mean of the 
weighted average rates daily traded on the Interbank Deposit Market. 
Guarantees. Real guarantees are mainly mortgages granted by borrowers to the bank; personal 
guarantees are guarantees granted by third parties in favor of borrowers. Data are drawn from Statistical 
Return. 
Loans and Bad Loans. Data are drawn from Statistical Return.  
Average Loan Life. This information is the average length (in years) of customer relationship for each 
bank in the sample; it is figured out for firms, using individual data and refers to a period of five years 
prior each reference date. Data are drawn from Central Credit Register. Given that the Central Credit 
Register records borrowers with loans larger than € 75,000, Average Loan Life has only been calculated 
for firms. Indeed, a large share of loans to households are smaller than € 75,000 and, therefore, Average 
Loan Life would be uninformative. 
Regional Dummy. Binary dummy variable that has a value of 1 for banks with headquarter in Southern 
Italy and 0 otherwise. 
Bank Size. Binary dummy variable that has a value of 1 for banks which are classified as “major” or 
“large”, according to Banca d'Italia’s classification by size (see Bank of Italy, 2006), and 0 otherwise. 
Market Concentration. Herfindhal index on new loans to firms and households. This variable is 
calculated for each time period of our sample. 
Average Loan Size. This variable is the ratio between loan and number of customers, i.e., the average 
loan size granted by each bank to customers. It is calculated by using individual data drawn from the 
Central Credit Register. As in the case of  Average Loan Life, this variable is calculated on for firms, 
because of the bias due to the threshold of € 75,000 in the case of households. 
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Appendix 2 
 















Spread   
(interest rate – overnight rate) 
3.863 2.883  -1.767  17.950 
Bad Loans/ Loans per branch  0.058  0.027  0.002  0.161 
Collateral/  Loans  0.170  0.345 0 1 
Personal guarantees/ Loans  0.808  1.948  0  99.930 
Average  Loan  Life  2.536  0.702 1 3 
 
Bank Interest Rates. Time series at firms level on interest rates are drawn from Central Credit Register 
and refer to the years 2003-2005; data are annual and are provided by a representative sample of about 60 
Italian banks. This dataset includes customers with loans over € 75,000. Overnight interest rates are the 
arithmetic mean of the weighted average rates daily traded on the Interbank Deposit Market. 
Guarantees. Real guarantees are mainly mortgages granted by borrowers to the bank; personal 
guarantees are guarantees granted by third parties in favor of borrowers and include those given for 
guarantee commitments. Data are drawn from Central Credit Register. 
Loans and Bad Loans per branch. Data are drawn from Statistical Return; this aggregate represents a 
proxy of customer’s risky.    
Average Loan Life. The number of years of customer relationship refers to the period included in 
dataset at firm level. Data are drawn from Central Credit Register.  
Regional Dummies. Three binary dummy variable for North, Centre and South Italy that has a value of 
1 for banks with headquarter in respective area and 0 otherwise. 
Firm Size. Binary dummy variable that has a value of 1 for firms which have loans over € 1,000,000 
and 0 otherwise. 
Type of Company Dummy. Binary dummy variable that has a value of 1 for private firms and 0 
otherwise.  
 
 